Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 24-02-2010 
process. Recognizing many deficiencies in the process as outlined in the 1 MAY 07 instruction, a complete re-write was undertaken and signed into implementation on 1 MAR 09. This revision streamlined the process but the current system, as implemented by the Joint Staff and the Army, in accordance with Army Regulation 71-9, is still too time-consuming to support the joint warfighters' needs in an environment that is technologically complex and rapidly changing. Furthermore, the current Army organization for requirements generation often results in requirements that are not producible at an affordable price or on a schedule that supports the warfighter. The Army must embrace greater service inter-dependence and institute a more disciplined and restrained requirements process by streamlining its own organization and procedures and by involving its most senior leaders more frequently and earlier in the process.
MAKING JCIDS WORK FOR THE WARFIGHTER
Does the current Acquisition system adequately support the joint warfighters' needs by providing material solutions to fill current and future capability gaps at an affordable price? Since the Department of Defense (DoD) was established in 1947 and particularly in the last 30 years, there have been many studies, panels, and reports commissioned by various Presidents, the Congress, and the military itself to try to make the Acquisition system more responsive to a rapidly changing world of technology and threats while eliminating waste and abuse. The results of these studies have changed the system around the edges and have arguably brought some much needed reform to the actual procurement process. However, these reforms have had limited success in improving DoD's ability to meet warfighters' requirements quickly and efficiently.
The real questions are whether or not changes to the DoD 5000 series have really benefited the joint warfighter? Have they positioned us to meet tomorrow's requirements? Is the Army's system for determining requirements meeting the joint warfighters' needs? Recent acquisition changes began with the signing of the first DoD Directive (DoDD) 5000.1 by then Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard in 1971. In the intervening 39 years, the 5000 series has changed fourteen times with countless smaller changes to the extensive collection of joint and service implementing instructions, directives, and regulations.
Acquisition reform certainly pre-dates the 1971 effort including the very successful Truman Commission during WWII. However, this paper will only examine those efforts that contribute to the efficiency of the modern joint Acquisition process. It could be argued that this began with the creation of the Department of Defense in 1947 but the implementation of the DoDD 5000 series was the first serious modern attempt at Department wide Acquisition reform. This study will: 1) begin with a review of the various changes to the joint Acquisition process with particular emphasis on changes to the requirements determination, documentation and approval process the services and joint staff use; 2) examine several key studies that have impacted the Acquisition and requirements processes; 3) discuss the technological challenges facing the Warfighter and the Acquisition community; and, 4) provide some recommendations for future reform.
Five of the fourteen changes to the DODD 5000 series had significant impact on the requirements portion of the Acquisition system. The original DoDD 5000 series published in 1971 (figure 1) was an eight-page document that required three DoD level decisions, or milestones. It also created the first of the Acquisition oversight panels, the Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC). The changes to the Acquisition process described above were in response to several internal and external (to DoD) studies and commissions. and most recently for the Army, the Reno Report that was completed in the summer of 2009, the effects of which are as yet unknown. Many of the same shortcomings are identified in each of the studies. The following paragraphs will summarize the relevant deficiencies identified in these studies.
In 1986, the first study released, by the Packard Commission, found that there was insufficient linkage between requirements, warfighters' needs, and national strategy. It also stated that the Acquisition system was overly burdened with oversight and bureaucracy. The commission argued that there were significant budgetary pressures from Congress and DoD to determine how much a solution would cost before answering the more critical questions of what it was for, why it was needed, and how well it should perform. The report identified that the requirements determination and development system overstated requirements and understated costs. This process led to material solutions that were inherently over-budget, behind schedule, and as a result, often obsolete by the time they were fielded.
The commission made six recommendations, the first five of which were directly relevant to the requirements determination process of Acquisition; the sixth dealt with materiel development. The report's first recommendation was to establish a clear responsibility for the program resting with a program manager who enjoys a "short, In 2000, the next major Acquisition reform report was issued in conjunction with DoD's Defense Reform Initiative entitled the President's National Performance Goals 2000. As part of this initiative, the Department identified twelve goals, three of which (goals one, five, and ten) were directly related to requirements development. The first goal was to reduce the cycle time to deliver new weapons by twenty-five percent. Cycle time is the time it takes a project to go from initial concept to fielding. A twenty-five percent reduction would mean going from an average of 132 months (over eleven years) to less than ninety-nine months (eight-plus years) for projects initiated after 1992.
Goal five directed increased modernization without increasing top-line spending. Goal ten dictated for the first time, that total-ownership cost be considered up front in the requirements process. This is a direct antecedent to the inclusion of cost as an independent variable as a key performance parameters (KPP) in the JCIDS system. Defense Review (QDR). The most significant requirements outcome from the QDR was the directive for DoD to switch from its traditional threat-based approach to a capabilities based approach. 9 The report identified that the Acquisition system failed to meet joint warfighter needs efficiently for two primary reasons. The first was that while needs are joint, solutions are almost always service specific because each service develops new material solutions based on its own modernization requirements. This results in inefficiencies at best and outright failure to deliver solutions at worse as we have seen with Crusader, Comanche and most recently Future Combat System. Secondly, the report claimed that the focus on the resourcing function involved senior leaders too late in the process. Earlier involvement would allow leaders to provide strategic direction instead of programmatic course corrections. Senior leaders focused on solving the problems instead of preventing them -and the associated delays and cost over-runs.
The report charged that this focus on resource input rather than capability output also hamstrung decision-makers by failing to provide them with the information they needed to support the warfighter. Policy, was also cited as having provided valuable input to the study.
The (CSIS) report dedicated an entire section to the joint requirements process and borrowed from an earlier report by Murdock and Flournoy, entitled Beyond
Goldwater-Nichols, Phase 2 Report. It argued that while the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislation had significant, albeit slow, impact on the joint operational community it failed in its endeavor to make the requirements determination process joint.
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Put plainly, only the Combatant Commanders have operational requirements; joint capability requirements, both near-and far-term, must drive DoD resource allocation and acquisitions policies and decisions. The U.S. military fights as a joint team. The decisions over what to buy for that joint team must be made from a joint perspective, even though the Military Services remain the primary means for actually "acquiring" the ready, trained, and equipped people that comprise these capabilities. 12 The introduction of JCIDS was a DoD attempt to make the requirements process into thinking jointly about capability needs, the process did not define precisely joint capability gaps or prioritize between them." 13 The CSIS study goes on to point out that based on recommendations from the Aldridge study, Combatant Commands' Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs) have been used to focus service requirements but have had less than a five percent cost impact on total procurement. 
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The Reno Report was also critical of the Army Training and Doctrine Command's (TRADOC) ability to manage the requirements process as it is currently organized and While these recommendations appear sound, it is important to note that there is no mention here of the joint warfighters' needs.
staffed. TRADOC plays the central role in determining Army requirements through its
Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) currently located at Ft Monroe. ARCIC is responsible to integrate and validate Army requirements. 27 TRADOC lacks sufficient analytical resources to perform quantitative analysis to the degree needed to support analytically-based decisions. This environment leads to decisions based on narrow focus, incomplete analytical detail, and excess reliance on "professional military judgment". Absent thorough integration of individual requirements into a holistic capability, leaders face difficult decisions in making resource-appraised and enterprise level choices. The addition of quantitative analytics and use of a blueprint or mosaic would allow leaders to visualize through multidimensional integration, the whole of the Army's capabilities and the need for additional requirements, along with their cost and benefit.
The report stated,
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The report is also critical of the Army's staffing procedures, stating that the timelines were too long and that the process lacked sufficient executive level oversight. documents to review, of which forty-two were Acquisition Category I (ACATI) and fortyfour had JROC interest -an indication that at a minimum these documents could lead to significant costs to the Army. 30 Over the past quarter century, these various reports and commissions discussed above have identified many problems such as inefficient staff organization, long lead times, insufficient warfighter input, and requirements documents that fail to properly define requirements. While there have been a significant number of changes to the regulatory requirements and the names of the processes, these reports suggest that the root problem still exists. The services, the Army included, still do a poor job of meeting the joint warfighters' needs in a timely manner at a reasonable cost. Inc, and PBS, as one of sixteen "revolutionaries who made America". 32 In 2001, he published an essay "The Law of Accelerating Returns" which said Moore's Law understates the rate of growth by making the common mistake of seeing too short a segment on an exponential curve and mistaking that for linear growth. 33 Kurzweil believes exponential growth curves become increasingly steep over centuries leading up to it. Most adults had never seen a car as a child and by the end of those two decades people were flying. Hence, the time between paradigm shifts had decreased to only a few decades. Today paradigm shifts occur every few years. One needs to look no further than the worldwide web for evidence. Kurzweil argued, An analysis of the history of technology shows that technological change is exponential, contrary to the common-sense 'intuitive linear' view. So we won't experience 100 years of progress in the 21st century-it will be more like 20,000 years of progress (at today's rate). The 'returns,' such as chip speed and cost-effectiveness, also increase exponentially. There's even exponential growth in the rate of exponential growth. 34 Kurzweil further believes we are very close to the point on the curve where a paradigm shifts will occur so rapidly that they will lead to "technological change so rapid and profound it represents a rupture in the fabric of human history." 35 Kurzweil further argued that already, within the past sixty years, life in the industrialized world has changed almost beyond recognition except for living memories from the first half of the 20th century. This pattern will culminate in unimaginable technological progress in the 21st century. If Kurzweil is right, or even partially right, then a capabilities development system that takes years to validate and approve will be obsolete before it can be fielded. Similarly, modernization programs that take a decade or more to satisfy are equally suspect. Furthermore, if our costs to address emerging threats continue to rise at current rates, while the barriers to entry for potential enemies continues to decline, we will find ourselves continuously responding to threats and unable to keep pace with increasingly sophisticated competitors.
In order to meet the needs of the warfighters we must fundamentally change two things. First, we must do a better job of predicting future gaps and appropriate solutions.
Second, we must more rapidly develop and field solutions to fill these gaps. While many of the reports discussed above have addressed these concerns and we have made some headway on the latter over the last several years, it has come at very high financial cost. Yet, there is little evidence that the requirements determination process has improved despite these numerous changes. the decisions to use only proven technologies, 2) minimized requirements, 3)increased competition in the contracting process, and 4) the government maintained responsibility for final integration. 36 The GAO report identified two other recommendations that should be implemented. First, "the acquisition process should not exceed six years from its beginning to initial operational capability of the acquired weapon system." 37 Second, and perhaps most important in this era of rapid changes, the GAO recommended significantly more investment in the Science and Technology community 38 The fielding of the MRAP provides hope that Acquisition reform can occur to better meet the needs of the joint warfighters. We must improve the process if we are to maintain our technological superiority in a rapidly changing, increasingly lethal, and complex world. Army senior leaders must have a greater appreciation for the rapidity with which technology is changing and have greater and earlier involvement in the requirements process. The Army must change the way it is organized for requirements determination and prepare requirements documents that provide greater flexibility to the materiel developers. The preponderance of new programs should be born-joint and be better aligned with warfighters' needs. In order to meet these goals the following steps must be taken. Internally, the Army should streamline its staff and process by implementing the organizational changes identified in the Reno Report. There are four items in particular that would make the Army more responsive to the warfighters' needs. First, specifically for requirements determination and development, the Army G-3/5/7 should eliminate DAMO-AV, BTF, AAWO, EW and LB and role their staff functions into DAMO-CI and DAMO-SS as appropriate. 39 The requirements and requirements documents must be shortened and simplified with a goal of bringing Major Defense Acquisition Programs from concept development to fielding within six years. In order to accomplish this, the Services, JS, and OSD will have to implement several changes. The first, and perhaps most important is to stop technological over-reach in acquisition programs and only develop requirements for which mature technologies exist. This would require the Army to stop the habit of "gold-plating" the requirements in an attempt to reach a "perfect" solution at the cost of very long cycle-times and incrementally high costs. In this era of rapidly changing technology, the Army and the joint warfighter would be better served by seeking "good-enough" solutions that are agile and upgradable that can be procured quickly and relatively inexpensively. This would free up more funds for investment in:
science, technology, and rapid transition, to incrementally more sophisticated and capable material solutions.
The Army must do a better job at filling capability gaps and meeting the needs of the joint warfighter with material solutions. Cycle times must be reduced from decades to years to prevent the fielding of very costly, obsolete systems. It can accomplish this by embracing greater service inter-dependence and instituting a more disciplined and restrained requirements process. Streamlining its own organization and procedures and involving its most senior leaders more frequently and earlier in the process can have the greatest immediate impact. With the exception of increasing the role of USJFCOM, all of the recommendations outlined above are within the Army's ability to execute to better support the joint warfighter.
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